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COMMENTS
Legislative Bodies-Conflict of InterestLegislators Prohibited From Contracting
With State*
A proper and timely interpretation of article 4, section 28 of the
New Mexico Constitution could solve the conflict of interest problem concerning legislators who enter into contracts with the state.
The relevant part of the section provides:
nor shall any member of the legislature during the term for which

he was elected nor within one year thereafter, be interested directly
or indirectly in any contract with the state or any municipality
thereof, which was authorized by any law passed during such term.

Several other states have similiar provisions1 and at least one state
has a statute to the same effect. 2 Unfortunately there are few cases
construing these provisions.3
A concise statement of the principle against conflicts of interest
is found in the Bible. "No man can serve two masters: for either
the other; or else he will hold to the
he will hate the one, and love
'4
one and despise the other."
This principle is embedded in the common law. 5 It has long been
applied in cases where public officers other than legislators have
entered into contracts with the state. These contracts have been
* N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 208 (1965).
1. See, e.g., Neb. Const. art. 3, § 16; Okla. Const. art. 5, § 23; S.D. Const. art. 3:
§12; Tex. Const. art. 3, § 18.
2. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 218.580 (1965).
3. The following cases deal with the problem directly: Berney v. Alexander, 42
Nev. 423, 178 Pac. 978 (1919); State ex rel. Maryland Cas. Co. v. State Highway
Comm'n, 38 N.M. 482, 35 P.2d 308 (1934) ; State ex rel. Baca v. Otero, 33 N.M. 310,
267 Pac. 68 (1928) ; State ex rel. Settles v. Board of Educ., 389 P.2d 356 (Okla. 1964) ;
Norbeck & Nicholson Co. v. State, 32 S.D. 189, 142 N.W. 847 (1913) ; Lillard v.
Freestone County, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 57 S.W. 338 (1900).
4. Mattheo 6:24; Luke 16:13.
5. This is a basic principle in the law of agency. See Abernathy v. Oklahoma,
31 F.2d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 599 (1929).
It is the duty of an agent, even of a private party, to look singly to the good
of his principal-not to attempt to line his own pockets with ill-gotten gains.
That he cannot serve two masters and serve both faithfully is as true in law
as in Holy Writ. He should not be permitted to occupy a position where duty
is likely to be forgotten in the quest for personal gain. How vastly more is
this true as to one who occupies a public position of trust and confidence.
See also Robertson v. Chapman, 152 U.S. 673 (1894) ; Wardell v. Railroad Co., 103
U.S. 651 (1880) ; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Mitchell, 190 F.2d 308 (5th
Cir. 1951) ; Cheney v. Unroe, 166 Ind. 550, 77 N.E. 1041 (1906).
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declared to be against public policy and hence void. 6 The reasoning
is that the officers are agents of the state and stand in a fiduciary
relationship to the public. Any act which breaches, or could potentially breach this trust is not allowed. Thus, a public officer should
not have any personal interest in any relations with the state which
might have an effect on his actions or decisions.
That this policy includes state legislators is shown in the case of
Norbeck & Nicholson Co. v. State.7 In this case the South Dakota
court held that a contract entered into by a state legislator with the
state was void.
A member of the state Legislature, by virtue of his office, stands in
fiduciary and trust relation towards the state; in other words, he is
the confidential agent of the state for the purpose of appropriating
the state's money in payment of the lawful contractual obligations
of the state, and it seems to be almost universally held that it is
against sound public policy to permit such an agent, or any agent
occupying a like position, to himself be directly or indirectly interested in any contract with the state or other municipality, during
the period of
time of the existence of such trust and confidential
relationship.8
Several other cases have held specifically that a member of the
legislature is a public officer.' There seems to be little doubt then
that these common law principles against conflict of interest situations are as valid for a state legislator as they are for any other
public officers.
The question of whether there is a conflict of interest when
a state legislator enters into a contract with the state is raised in
Attorney General Opinion Number 65-208.1° The specific question
was whether a member of the state legislature could bid on a state
contract for the purchase of furniture to equip the new state capitol
buildings.
6. Spence v. Harvey, 22 Cal. 336, 83 Am. Dec. 69 (Sup. Ct. 1863) ; Goodyear v.
Brown, 155 Pa. 514, 26 At. 665 (1893). The Court in Cheney v. Unroe, supra note
5, at 1043, quoting from Greenhood, Public Policy 337, said: "Any contract by one
acting in a public capacity, which restricts the free exercise of a discretion vested in
him for the public good, is void."
7. 32 S.D. 189, 142 N.W. 847 (1913).
8. 142 N.W. at 849.
9. Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103 (1916) ; State ex rel. v. Lockhart, 76
Ariz. 390, 265 P.2d 447 (1953) ; State ex rel. Grant v. Eaton, 114 Mont. 199, 133 P.2d
588 (1943) ; In re Ricker, 66 N.H. 207, 29 At. 559 (1890) ; Morril v. Haines, 2 N.H.
246 (1820). Contra, In re Speakership of the House of Representatives, 15 Colo.
520, 25 Pac. 707 (1891).
10. N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 208 (1965).
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The senator had been a member of the state legislature in 1963"
when the State Capitol Expansion Act was passed. 2 The act gave
new powers to the Capitol Buildings Improvement Commission and
authorized the sale of severance3 tax bonds to raise money to
carry out the provisions of the act.'
The senator was also a member of the legislature in 1965'" when
section 6-2-23 of the New Mexico statutes was passed. 5 This
statute authorized the State Board of Finance to issue additional
severance tax bonds to provide funds for carrying out the State
Capitol Expansion Act and to "equip, remodel and furnish capitol
facilities . . . 16
The other important act involved in the question was passed in
1945.7 The relevant portion of this act established the Capitol
Buildings Improvement Commission.' 8 The Commission was authorized to purchase "all necessary furniture and equipment necessary
and requisite for the furnishing and equipping of the capitol building, as reconstructed and altered, and any new building ....
The specific question dealt with by the Attorney General in his
opinion was whether article 4, section 28 of the New Mexico Constitution prohibited the senator from entering into a contract for
the purchase of furniture to equip the state capitol buildings. The
Attorney General ruled that article 4, section 28 of the New Mexico
Constitution did not prohibit the senator from entering into such
a contract.2 The Attorney General said that the State Capitol
Expansion Act passed in 1963 did not specifically mention the
furnishing of any new or improved capitol buildings and therefore
had no bearing on the question. He reasoned that section 6-2-23 of
the New Mexico statutes simply provided for a method of financing
to carry out the objectives of equipping, remodeling, and furnishing
21
capitol facilities, but did not specifically authorize these objectives.
The Attorney General reasoned that because article 4, section 28
prohibits a legislator from entering into only those contracts
authorized during his term and that because the contract was author11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

N.M. Laws 1963, at vi.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-14 (Repl. 1966).
Ibid.
N.M. Laws 1965, at vi.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-23 (Repl. 1966).
Ibid.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-1 to -12 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-3 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-10 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 208 (1965).
Ibid.
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ized by the 1945 act when the senator was not a member of the
22
legislature, he was not prohibited from entering into the contract.
In construing a constitutional provision, one must look at the
principles and reasons for its existence rather than strictly apply
the words of the provision to the facts. 23 "Constitutions and
statutes are declarations of public policy by bodies of men authorized to legislate.1 24 This statement is especially true of a constitutional provision. A constitutional provision is a statement of public
policy and cannot be expected to provide for every contingency in
every area that it covers. Its provisions must be flexible and not be
allowed to become narrow, rigid rules of law.
In construing the last clause of article 4, section 28 one must
consider what the draftsmen had in mind when they included it
in the section. One must attempt to discover what kind of contracts
the draftsmen intended to prohibit.
The intent was not to prohibit legislators from entering into
every possible contract with the state. The presence of the qualifying phrase, "authorized by any law passed during such term ' 2 5 is
evidence of this. That courts generally appreciate this fact is indicated in a Nevada case, Berney v. lexander,26 which involved
a state statute substantially similiar to the New Mexico constitutional provision. In this case a member of the state legislature was
allowed to enter into a contract with the state. There was no connection between his function as a legislator and the contract in
had been no legislation which had
question. During his term 2there
7
any relation to the contract.
This decision was politically and practically sound. Many legislators are also businessmen who have had, and will continue to
have, business transactions with the state. To prevent these men
from entering into any contracts with the state would hurt their
businesses and probably would prevent them from running for
22. Ibid.
23. The New Mexico Supreme Court in State ex rel. Ward v. Romero, 17 N.M.
88 100, 125 Pac. 617, 621 (1912) said,
Where the spirit and intent of the instrument can be clearly ascertained,
effect should be given to it, and the strict letter should not control if the
letter leads to incongruous results clearly not intended.
See also, Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1880) ; Woodson v. Murdock, 89 U.S.
351 (1874).
24. 6A Corbin, Contracts § 1375, at 15 (1962).

25. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 28.
26. 42 Nev. 423, 178 Pac. 978 (1919).
27. Ibid.
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office.2 This:would restrict further an already limited class of
29
people from which state legislators are elected.
Moreover, for the same reasons stated above, the draftsmen
did not intend to prohibit legislators from entering into contracts
when their only official relation to the contract was the fact that
they voted on a general appropriation bill which appropriated
money to the agency which authorized the contract. General appropriation bills, limited by the constitution, °
embrace nothing but appropriations for the expense of the executive,

legislative and judiciary departments, interest, sinking fund, payments on the public debt, public schools, and other expenses required by existing laws .... 31
These are all basic functions of government. It is necessary that
funds be appropriated for these functions every year. To prohibit
legislators from entering into contracts which were affected only by
these bills in a very indirect manner would prohibit them from
entering into many contracts which from a practical standpoint,
they had no connection with in their official capacity. This is the
distinguishing factor in the New Mexico case of State ex rel. Baca
v. Otero,3 2 which the Attorney General relies on in his opinion.
State ex rel. Baca v. Otero held that a contract under a general
appropriation bill does not offend article 4, section 28 of the New
Mexico Constitution. In this case the contractor was a legislator
who also held an office as "rural school supervisor." It was argued
that there was no such office as "rural school supervisor" and thus,
the contractor must be employed on the basis of a contract. The
respondent State Auditor argued that the general appropriation
bill of 1927 granted the authority for the contract of employment.
Therefore, since the contractor was a member of the 1927 legislature which passed the bill, he could not enter into the contract.
The New Mexico court ruled that the contract was not authorized
by the general appropriation bill but by an earlier bill passed in
1923 which gave the Superintendent of Public Instruction the
power to supervise rural schools."
The Otero case, which is relied upon as an authority by the
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Comment, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1209 (1963).
Ibid.
N.M. Const. art. 4, § 16.
Ibid.
33 N.M. 310, 267 Pac. 68 (1928).

33. Ibid.
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Attorney General, 4 is easily distinguished from the specific situation to which he was addressing his opinion. The State Capitol
Expansion Act of 1963 3 and the bill passed in 196536 are not
general appropriation bills. 37 They do not meet the criteria listed in
article 4, section 16 of the New Mexico Constitution. Instead, they
provide for a special fund to be created by the sale of bonds to
finance special projects which do not have to be carried out at any
particular time or at all. Thus, whether or not these bills were
passed determined in fact whether there would be any contracts to
carry out these projects. In the fact situation of the Attorney
General's opinion, the senator would not have been able to enter
into the contract for the sale of furniture to the state if section
6-2-23 had not been passed while he was a member of the legislature in 1965. The Capitol Building Improvement Commission
would not have had any money for the purpose of furnishing the
new capitol buildings. By providing money "to equip, remodel and
furnish capitol facilities" ' this bill enabled the commission to enter
into a contract for that purpose. The contract with the senator to
furnish the new capitol buildings would not have been possible
without the passage of section 6-2-23.
The Attorney General relies on the word "authorized" in article
4, section 28 of the New Mexico Constitution without ever defining
it. To "authorize" is "to empower; to give a right or authority to
act." 39 "Authority" is synomymous with "permission." 4 ° Thus,
a contract that was authorized by an act passed during a term of the
legislature is one that was permitted by that act. Section 6-2-23 was
certainly the bill which permitted or authorized the contract with
the senator. In this respect as well, the contract would not have been
possible without the passage of the bill.
The Attorney General also relies on the New Mexico case of
State ex rel. Maryland Cas. Co. v. State Highway Contm'n.4 ' In
this case the contractor, an insurance company, sought a writ of
mandamus to force the State Highway Commission to pay premiums of over 5,000 dollars. The State Highway Commission had
cancelled the policy before the period for which the insurance was
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 208 (1965).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-14 (Repl. 1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-23 (Repl. 1966).
See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-23 (Repl. 1966).
Black, Law Dictionary 169 (4th ed. 1951).
Id. at 168.
38 N.M. 482, 35 P.2d 308 (1934).
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bought had passed. They had a right to cancel, but at the cost of
short rates. At the short rate cost the Commission owed over
5,000 dollars in addition to the premium paid in advance. The
Commission refused to pay and said that the contract was void
because of article 4, section 28. The Commission contended that
the president and a stockholder of the local agency had been a
member of the legislature in 1929 when the contract was authorized. The contractor argued that the contract was authorized by a
bill passed in 1927 when the president of the agency was not a
member of the legislature.
The New Mexico Supreme Court said that the 1929 act was
really a collation of an older 1917 act and the 1927 act with a
few minor amendments in the wording. The court talked about
which act granted the authority for the contract and, to determine
this, the real question seemed to be whether the contract could have
been entered into if the 1929 act had not been passed. The court
found that the same contract could have been entered into even if
the 1929 act had not been passed; therefore the 1929 act did not
grant the authority for the contract.4 2 That situation is decidedly
different from the situation being considered in the Attorney
General's opinion. In this situation the state senator could not have
43
entered into the contract if section 6-2-23 had not been passed.
The above suggests a test which could be applied in questions
involving article 4, section 28. The test would be whether the contract could have been entered into by the state if the act in question
had not been passed. If the answer is "yes," the act had no bearing
on the contract and did not authorize it. If the answer is "no,"
the act made the formation of the contract possible. It permitted
and therefore authorized the contract within the meaning of the
provision.
If the Attorney General's interpretation of article 4, section 28
were to become law in New Mexico, this constitutional provision
would be rendered largely impotent to prevent the situation for
which it was designed. Only the most direct conflict of interest
situations would be affected by the provision. Under the Attorney
General's interpretation, the creation of any Commission or office
could be considered to have authorized later contracts made under
its authority no matter how much the existence of those contracts
depended on later legislation.
42. Ibid.
43. See text accompanying notes 38-40 sutra.
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In the last paragraph of the opinion the Attorney General states
one of the reasons for the provision: "We must remember that
Article 4, Section 28 is designed to prevent a member of the legislature from benefiting from an act of the legislature of which he
is a member at the expense of the general welfare."' 44 Then in the
face of the facts he says: "Such could hardly be the case here."4' 5
But that is exactly the case here. The senator benefited greatly from
an act of the legislature of which he was a member. No matter
what else the senator had to do to get the contract,"' he was still
directly interested in a bill passed during his term.
By construing article 4, section 28 in the strictest possible manner,
the Attorney General has rendered this constitutional provision
practically useless. If the Attorney General had construed the provision in the light of the above mentioned purposes and reasons, the
senator who wanted to enter into the contract with the state might
have brought an action in court. The New Mexico Supreme Court
would then have had an opportunity to clarify the law in the area.
Since it does not appear that the New Mexico Supreme Court
will have the chance to review this particular situation, perhaps the
legislature will enact clear and unambiguous legislation to achieve
the same effect.
JOHN M. WELLS

44. N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 208 (1965).
45. Ibid.
46. The Attorney General in his opinion explained that in order to get the
contract, a person would have to bid through the State Purchasing Agent. He also
noted that the Capitol Building Improvement Commission and the State Board of
Finance had "considerable control" over the bidding and contracting.

